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Introduction
By now, it has become a widely acknowledged fact that maturity mismatch in banks' funding structure has been one of the major causes of the [2007] [2008] [2009] nancial crisis. Even though regulatory eorts at the international level address this issue with rigour, the optimal design of liquidity regulation receives less attention, let alone interactions with other regulatory measures, central banks' monetary policy implementation or the sense or non-sense of its implementation during an ongoing crisis.
The connection between debt maturity choice and risk-taking is not novel, and it is not novel to the 2007-2009 crisis. The fact that the choice of risk in a portfolio is closely related to the degree of asymmetric information in a market and the possibility of a separating equilibrium has already been nicely shown by e.g. Flannery (1986) or Diamond (1991) . Our model relates to this strand of literature in the sense that asymmetric information is the cause of a sub-optimal outcome. Berger et al. (2005) test these models to conrm that for low-risk rms funding maturity tends to increased when the degree of asymmetric information is lower.
Risk-taking has been closely connected to a bank's funding structure. The Basel Committee has identied this link as a crucial cause of the 2007-2009 nancial crisis. As a result, Basel III banking regulation contains an extensive framework for liquidity regulation that requires banks to hold a short-term liquidity buer (the Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and prove a more stable longterm funding base (the Net Stable Funding Ratio). While it is clear that such a form of regulation may achieve its objective even though it may not achieve the most ecient outcome (Perotti and We model the short-term interbank market, both secured and unsecured, under asymmetric information -in a baseline scenario, when collateral for borrowing in the secured market is scarce, and in the presence of external eects.
While even in the presence of asymmetric information the market outcome is optimal when there is abundant collateral available and there are no external eects, the market outcome can be suboptimal in case of collateral shortage or in the presence of an externality.
We show that the intermediation of a central bank in the interbank market can be welfare-improving in the presence of collateral constraints when there is asymmetric information. The central bank acts as a mediator on the interbank market, via a corridor system. It provides a deposit facility and a lending facility, where it lends funds against central bank eligible collateral. When the central bank accepts a wider set of collateral than the market, its intermediation can improve social welfare compared to the market outcome. Our model also emphasises that the presence of the central bank cannot reduce ineciencies caused by the presence of external eects. Such a situation makes the case for the intervention of a regulator.
We show that the regulator can internalise the externality by taxing risky behaviour. Our model thereby reects recent regulatory developments in liquidity regulation. However, in the presence of collateral constraints the regulator faces the trade-o of constraining the unsecured market activity to attenuate the eects of the externality while the regulator should not shut down the unsecured market completely as it is necessary for renancing due to collateral constraints.
For this case, our analysis shows that the presence of both the regulator and the central bank can lead to a freeriding of the regulator at the cost of the central bank to shut down the unsecured market, which leads to a complete crowding out of market activity by central bank funding. This implies that the existence of a regulator and a central bank may actually lead to a suboptimal outcome.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model set-up, characterised by asymmetric information, and the notation for three cases: baseline model with neither collateral constraints nor externality, collateral constraints, and the presence of an externality. Section 3 discusses the market outcomes for the three cases. Section 4 gives the normative analysis for the social planner, compares the normative and the positive outcome and establishes the case for an intervention in the interbank market. We show in section 5 that a central bank can remove the ineciencies caused by collateral constraints and asymmetric information, while we show in section 6 that a regulator can remove the ineciencies caused by the externality. Section 7 then highlights that the combination of a central bank and a regulator may not always be welfare-improving compared to the case with either a central bank or a regulator. Section 8 concludes. 2 
The basic model
The basic set-up will serve as a benchmark case against which we can evaluate the intervention of a central bank in the money market, the intervention of a regulator and the impact on the equilibrium if there is both an intervention of the central bank and an intervention of the regulator. To justify the intervention of the central bank in the market equilibrium, we model a case in which asymmetric information, combined with collateral constraints, leads to a sub-optimal market outcome. To justify the intervention of a regulator, we model a situation in which an externality leads to a sub-optimal market outcome.
In our analysis of this basic set-up, we distinguish between two cases that lead to a sub-optimal market equilibrium. First, we analyse a situation with collateral constraints when all borrower types may have to resort to unsecured borrowing and the lenders cannot distinguish the borrowers' type. Second, we consider the case in which a borrower's investment decision has an eect on every borrower's probability of success and thus creates an externality.
The basic set-up consists of an interbank market that has both an unsecured and a secured segment (i.e. for collateralised borrowing). There are two types of banks on the interbank market, (wholesale) borrowers and (wholesale) lenders, who can form an agreement to nance a project. Borrowers can ask for the amount I which they can invest in two types of investment: either a safe project which returns A with certainty, or a risky project which returns θ with probability p i and 0 with probability 1 − p i , where I, θ, A > 0. Clearly, borrowers with a high success probability invest in the risky asset, while borrowers with a low success probability invest in the safe asset. We assume that all agents are risk-neutral, so that they care about maximising their expected payout.
The borrower always needs to invest the full amount I, i.e. he cannot partition his resources to invest in both types of investment. However, we allow for the option to combine borrowing on the secured and on the unsecured market, i.e. the borrower could borrow a share ρ of the funding on the secured market and a share 1 − ρ on the unsecured market.
In the basic model, we assume that collateral is sucient to cover all borrowing needs, but relax this assumption subsequently. Borrowers have thus two options to access funding: they can use collateral for collateralised borrowing on the secured market, but they can also access the unsecured market directly without using their collateral.
The incentive to borrow secured lies in the lower rates that would be applied by lenders, because the lender can capture the collateral in case of failure. On the secured market, the borrower posts an amount of collateral that covers the outstanding debt (plus interest) to the lender. In case the project is unsuccessful and the borrower cannot repay, the lender seizes the collateral. Thus, the borrower carries the risk of the investment project. On the unsecured market, the lender is not repaid in case a project is unsuccessful, thus the lender carries the risk.
Let R s be the interest rate on the secured market and R u be the interest rate 3 on the unsecured market. Given the fact that borrowers and lenders have the choice between the secured and the unsecured market, and that the lender will need to be compensated for the additional risk borne when lending unsecured,
We introduce asymmetric information by assuming the probability p i ∈ [0, 1] to be borrower-specic. The probability p i can thus be interpreted as the borrower's type. The borrowers' type is distributed along the interval [0, 1] according to the probability distribution function f . A borrower i will know about their type p i , but the lenders cannot observe p i . Put dierently, they cannot discriminate between borrowers based on a borrower's type. Both borrowers and lenders know the distribution f of types in the population.
For a borrower to have an incentive to invest in the safe project, A ≥ R s I must hold, and in order to have an incentive to invest in the risky project, θ ≥ R s I must hold. In order to have an incentive to invest in the risky project instead of the safe project, θ ≥ A (and θ > A if p i < 1) must hold.
Corollary 1 If the equilibrium market interest rate on the secured market is R s , then A ≥ R s I or θ ≥ R s I is a necessary condition for market activity.
Corollary 2 A necessary condition for investment to take place in the risky project instead of the safe project is θ ≥ A (and θ > A if p i < 1 for all borrowers).
If we assume that there is a safe store of assets (that does not bear interest), there is always the risk-free alternative of not conducting any investment or lending activity. In this case, it is clear that R s ≥ 1, since the lender always has the alternative to keep their funds. To keep the model simple, we assume that the lender can always claim the collateral in case the investment does not pay o and that a loan must be overcollateralised, such that the lender does not bear any risk when lending secured. Assuming perfect market functioning, the secured interest rate will then be equal to 1 whenever there is a safe store of assets as alternative.
Corollary 3 If there is a safe store of assets, then the equilibrium market interest rate on the secured market is R s ≥ 1.
In addition to evaluating the rst-best outcome and the market outcome for this basic set-up, we augment the model by introducing collateral constrains and by introducing external eects. Consequently, our analyses in this paper always consist of a comparison of the basic model outcome with the model including collateral constraints and with the model including external eects.
These analyses provide the argument for introducing a central bank to the model as well as a regulator.
Including collateral liquidation costs in the model would lead to a secured rate which is slightly higher than 1, because the lender would have to take these collateral liquidation costs into account when setting the appropriate secured interest rate. As this does not change the basic structure of the model, we ignore these costs.
3 Positive analysis
Payo structure for borrowers
We rst analyse the situation of the borrower. When analysing the behaviour of the borrower, we take the interest rates as given. ! We assume that investing is protable, i.e. A > I and θ > I.
A borrower has three options for nancing the project. First, a borrower can borrow secured, second the borrower can borrow unsecured, and the third option is to combine borrowing on the secured and on the unsecured market, i.e. the borrower could borrow a share ρ of the funding on the secured market and a share 1 − ρ on the unsecured market. We will refer to this option as a mixed strategy. If there is abundant collateral, a borrower will always either choose the secured market or choose the unsecured market. For any individual borrower, the choice of the (expected) higher-paying strategy is superior to a mixed strategy, thus the mixed strategy is never optimal.
As borrowers can only either invest in the safe asset or invest in the risky asset, but not combine the two investment options, this gives four (corner) options for which we can compare a borrower's payo. These are illustrated in Table 1 . " 
We assume that a borrower always wants to invest, i.e. Π s B (saf e) = A − R s I > 0 (or, in the collateral-constrained case, Π sλ B (saf e) = A − (R s λ + R u (1 − λ))I > 0). ! These will then be set by looking at the optimisation behaviour of the lender -in equilibrium, the interest rates would be such that the lender is indierent with respect to lending secured or unsecured.
" As we will see that the mixed strategy is never optimal, we exclude this option in the table and the detailed discussion.
The optimal funding strategy is thus determined by a borrower's type, because the payo from investing in the risky asset is a linear function of p i .
Whether to borrow unsecured or secured when investing risky depends on the value of p i . Borrowing secured is more protable when the value of p i is comparatively high, because a high probability of success implies a low probability of losing the collateral. This is illustrated by the fact that the intercept for protable for the borrower to invest in the safe asset, they will therefore always prefer to borrow on the secured market.
Given the prot functions, it is clear that a borrower with p i < p Z will choose to invest in the safe asset and borrow on the secured market, and a borrower with p i ≥ p Y will choose to invest in the risky asset and borrow on the secured market. 
It is also possible that borrowing on the secured market is always more protable than borrowing on the unsecured market, for example due to a large # (saf e) = A − R s I > 0, a borrower will never choose a mixed strategy. A borrower will then either borrow on the secured or on the unsecured market.
If A θ > R s R u , i.e. p T > p Y , the borrower will always borrow on the secured market. The borrower will invest in the safe asset whenever p i ≤ p T and in the risky asset whenever p i > p T .
, the borrower will borrow on the secured market and invest in the safe asset for p i ∈ [0, p Z ]. The borrower will borrow on the unsecured market and invest in the risky asset for
The borrower will borrow on the secured market and invest in the risky asset for
Intuitively, when the probability of success when investing in the risky asset is so low that the expected gains from investing in the safe asset are always larger than investing in the risky asset, even though losses could be passed on to the lender when borrowing unsecured, the borrower will invest in the safe asset. As a consequence of always investing in the safe asset, the borrower will borrow on the secured market. This is the case for values of p i below p Z . If, however, the risky asset is clearly preferable even if the borrower has to take the losses himself, because the probability of success is very high, then he will invest in the risky asset and borrow on the secured market. This is the case for values of p i above p T . For intermediate types, the borrower would like to borrow unsecured whenever they are unsuccessful to pass on the losses to the lender, but otherwise borrow secured and opt for the safe asset. The choice of the investment option is therefore clearly determined by the lenders' choice of rates.
Collateral constraints
The role of the unsecured market is limited when all borrowers have enough collateral available to renance themselves on the secured market. The invest-
will invest in the safe asset and those with p T ≤ p i ≤ p Y will invest in the risky asset. The lender can consider this when setting rates.
However, when we assume collateral constraints, all borrowers have to resort to the unsecured market to a certain extent. Even if it would be optimal to borrow only on the secured market, borrowers will not be able to do so. In such a case, borrowing unsecured does not reveal the borrower's type. Thus, such a case gives rise to a (partial) pooling equilibrium.
For simplicity, we assume that the constraints are the same for all borrowers.
Borrowers can only borrow the share λ < 1 of the total loan I on the secured market and have to borrow the rest on the unsecured market. We assume that borrowers need to borrow the total amount I in order to be able to invest. Therefore, in case a borrower is collateral constrained, they have only two borrowing options. They can either borrow partly on the secured and partly on the unsecured market, or they can borrow only on the unsecured market.
%
The payo structure then is given in Table 2 . 
The borrower's return when investing in the safe asset and borrowing as % It will always be optimal for the borrower to borrow as much as possible on the secured market, such that the payo options reduce to borrowing the share λI on the secured market and the share (1 − λ)I on the unsecured market and investing either safe or risky or borrowing the whole amount of I on the unsecured market and investing either safe or risky. Π_B^u safe
Π_B^s risky
Π_B^u risky much as possible on the secured market is Π sλ
The borrower's expected return when investing in the risky asset and borrowing as much as possible on the secured market is Π sλ
The trade-o for the borrower is therefore driven by the share they can borrow on the secured market and their probability to be successful when investing risky.
The analysis in the case of a collateral-constrained borrower is similar to the baseline model.
It is straightforward that a borrower will always borrow as much as possible on the secured market for a given investment option, because secured rates are
. Again, when the success probability p i is suciently low, borrowers will borrow the share λ on the secured market and invest in the safe asset whenever A > (R s λ + R u (1 − λ))I. If the success probability p i is suciently high, borrowers will borrow on the secured market and invest in the risky asset whenever (θ−R u (1−λ)I)p i −R s λI > 0.
If the secured market would always be more protable, borrowers would borrow the share λ on the secured market and borrowers with 
borrowers which choose to only borrow on the unsecured market and choose to invest in the risky asset who would have invested in the safe asset in the case without collateral constraints. We show in appendix
These considerations are summarised in proposition 5.
Proposition 5 If investing is protable, i.e. A > I and θ > I and if a borrower always wants to invest, i.e. Π sλ
, a borrower will always borrow as much as possible on the secured market and invest in the safe asset whenever p i ≤ p T λ and invest in the risky asset whenever
a borrower will borrow as much as possible on the secured market and invest in the safe asset whenever
the borrower will borrow on the unsecured market and invest in the risky asset
, and the borrower will borrow as much as possible on the secured market and invest in the risky asset whenever
Externality
The existence of external eects also aects the market equilibrium. To analyse how external eects change the market equilibrium, we introduce an externality by assuming that each borrower's success probability decreases with an increasing aggregate investment in the risky asset. Dene a cuto probability p E such that all borrowers with p i ≥ p E invest in the risky asset. The success probability of each borrower p i is reduced by multiplication with a factor δ ≤ 1, where δ is an increasing function of the share of borrowers that invest in the risky asset 1 − F (p E ). We set δ := F (p E ) ≤ 1 and denep i := p i δ as the new success probability of the borrower of type i. The more borrowers invest in the risky asset, the more the probability distribution of p becomes skewed to the left, i.e. the lower the aggregate probability of success.
An individual borrower will typically not consider their eect on the aggregate probability of success. The straightforward consequence is a share of investment in the risky asset that is too high from an economy-wide perspective.
The social planner would choose a lower share. In this sense, the interpretation of the externality in our model is similar to the externality in Perotti and Suarez (2011) .
For simplicity, we assume that the lenders do not consider the overall reduction in the success probability either, i.e. the eect of the externality is not considered by borrowers and lenders and only known to the social planner. As a consequence, the payout structure tables are the same as for the basic case.
As the success probability changes, the expected value of the risky investment changes. The eect of the externality is not taken into account by borrowers and lenders. Thus, the payout structure given for the basic case, with the undistorted success probability, is assumed by market participants and forms the basis for their decisions.
The actual payout structure is lower, given that the success probabilities are reduced. However, this will only be known to borrowers and lenders ex post. The borrower's true return when investing on the risky asset on the secured market
The borrower's true return when investing on the risky asset on the unsecured market is Π u
. Accordingly, the lender's true return is reduced.
The trade-o for the borrower is identical to the case without an externality, but overall welfare is lower due to the externality.
Payo structure for lenders
The payo for the lender is the net prot from lending, i.e. the dierence between the prot when lending, R u or R s times the investment I, and the opportunity cost of lending, which is just I, because we assumed that the resources do not lose their value when they are not lent. When the borrower invests in the safe asset, the lender receives the prot from lending with certainty, while they only receive the prot with probability p i if the borrower invests in the risky asset and have a loss otherwise. As a consequence, Table 3 illustrates the corresponding payo functions. 
The lender's (certain) prot when lending on the secured market is Π s L = (R s −1)I. The lender's prot when lending on the unsecured market is Π u L (risky) = (R u I)p i +(−I)(1−p i ) if the borrower takes a risky investment, and Π u L (saf e) = (R u − 1)I otherwise.
As the lender neither knows p i nor if the borrower will invest risky or safe, the lender will have to consider the expected return from lending on the unsecured market. This depends on the expectation of p depending on the known distribution function f , taking into account whether the borrower invests in the safe/risky asset, as well as whether the borrower with such a p will borrow on the secured/unsecured market. In other words, the lender has to form a belief about the borrower's type p i conditional on whether the borrower participates in a certain (i.e. secured or unsecured) market. Let q ∈ {0; 1} be an indicator that is 1 whenever a transaction takes place on the unsecured market.
The lender's expected prot when lending on the unsecured market is thus given by a conditional expectation, namely the expected return conditional on the borrower borrowing on the unsecured market. This is the agreed payout (R u − 1)I if the borrower invests in the safe asset, or if they invest in the risky asset and are successful, and it is −I if the borrower invests in the risky asset and is unsuccessful. This means that we have to write the lender's expected return on the unsecured market as a function of conditional expectations on the borrower borrowing on the unsecured market (i.e. given that the transaction takes place on the unsecured market, or q = 1):
where the terms ϕ(A) denotes the probability of the case that a borrower invests safe, ϕ(B) denotes the probability that a borrower invests risky, but is successful and ϕ(C) denotes the probability that a borrower invests risky, but is unsuccessful. As a consequence,
The complexity arises from the fact that the share which the borrower borrows on the unsecured market is determined by his type.
Intuitively, the borrower has an incentive to borrow unsecured instead of secured, because the unsecured market allows the borrower to shift the risk of being unsuccessful when investing in the risky project to the lender. For a borrower with a relatively low p i , investing risky may not be an option, because the expected return from borrowing risky is too low compared to the safe return when investing safe. Such borrowers would always prefer the secured market because of lower interest rates on the secured market.
Without asymmetric information about the borrower's type, the higher rate on the unsecured market should compensate the lender for carrying the risk of failure. However, the lender cannot perfectly distinguish between borrowers on the unsecured market. Therefore, we have to establish the lenders' conditional expectation about the probability of a borrower to invest in the safe or in the risky asset conditional on the borrower borrowing secured or unsecured.
To simplify the notation for this conditional expectation, we dene several functions on the interval [0, 1]: The probability to invest in the safe asset 1 A is 1 if the borrower of type p i invests in the safe asset and 0 otherwise. The probability of investing in the risky asset 1 B∪C is 1 if the borrower of type p i invests in the risky asset and 0 otherwise. The probability of an investor investing in the risky asset and being successful 1 B is 1 if the borrower of type p i invests in the risky asset and is successful and 0 otherwise. Analogously, 1 C is 1 if the borrower of type p i invests in the risky asset and is unsuccessful and 0 otherwise. Note that 1 B and 1 C can only be observed after the investments are realised. All other variables are deterministic functions of p i , i.e. they are known if p i is known, given the rational, prot-maximising behaviour of the borrower.
Using this notation, the expected return of the lender on the unsecured market, which is conditional on the borrower borrowing on the unsecured market, can be written as
We can reformulate the above conditional expectation into an unconditional expectation by introducing some more notation: We dene ψ as the function giving the share of funding that a borrower of type p i will borrow on the unsecured market. We dene id as the identity function. Using some basic mathematical identities, the lender's expected prot when lending on the unsecured market is then given by :
where the expected value is calculated with respect to the measure induced on [0, 1] by the density f .
The numerator is the sum of two components: The expected value in case of a safe borrower (where the payout probability is 1; it is multiplied by the share that is borrowed on the unsecured market) and the expected value in case of a risky borrower (where the payout probability is p i , which is taken up by including the function id in the formula; it is again multiplied by the share that is borrowed on the unsecured market). The denominator is the total share of funding obtained on the unsecured market. Finally, I has to be subtracted to calculate the lender's net prot.
The behaviour of the lender determines the interest rates R u and R s . If the lender is indierent between lending on the secured or on the unsecured market, the resulting rates R u and R s constitute an equilibrium.
This choice between the secured and the unsecured market only makes sense if there is a borrower that is willing to borrow on the unsecured market. Thus, we assume that we are in the second case, with A θ < R s R u . The lender's certain prot when lending on the secured market is Π s L = (R s − 1)I.
We recall Equation 1, where ψ gives the share of funding that a borrower of type p i will borrow on the unsecured market.
We have seen above that in the basic case no borrower will borrow on the unsecured market to invest in the safe asset. Thus, ψ1 A will always be 0. We have also seen that precisely the borrowers in the range p i ∈ [p Z , p Y ] will borrow on the unsecured market, i.e. ψ will be equal to 1 for p ∈ [p Z , p Y ], and to 0 else.
The lender's expected payout when lending on the unsecured market becomes
Thus, the lender will lend on the unsecured market if
Thus, the conditional expectation above can never be greater than R s /R u , and it never makes sense for the lender to lend on the unsecured market.
One can also interpret this result in the sense that the lender will, in this case, set the rate on the unsecured market prohibitively high, i.e. R u ≥ R s θ A . This pushes all borrowers onto the secured market and will avoid any moral hazard behaviour.
We have a pooling equilibrium: all borrowers borrow on the secured market, and their type cannot be distinguished by their market behaviour.
In case there are collateral constraints, it is not only the borrowers with certain p i that would borrow on the unsecured market. In principle, all borrowers will borrow (at least a certain share of their funding) on the unsecured market.
In this case, when calculating the expected prot on the unsecured market, the lender will have to consider both the case where the borrower invests in the safe asset and the case where the borrower invests in the risky asset.
We recall that the lender's expected prot when lending on the unsecured market is given by Equation 1 (where the expected value is calculated with respect to the measure induced on [0, 1] by the density f ):
where ψ gives the share of funding that a borrower of type p i will borrow on the unsecured market.
We have to distinguish two cases:
First, we consider the case with
In this case, all borrowers will borrow as much as possible on the secured market, and they will invest in the risky asset if and only if p i > p T λ . The lender will thus set the unsecured rate based on the belief that every borrower borrows a share (1 − λ) on the unsecured market. The unsecured rate will be somewhat higher than the secured rate, since losses will be passed on to the lender in case of a non-successful risky investment.
We see this formally in the following calculation:
The last equation holds because we know that ∫ 1 0 f dp = 1 (as f is a probability density).
The lender's payout on the secured market is
Setting the two equal, we obtain
as equilibrium condition for the secured/unsecured rate.
Next, we consider the case with
In the collateral-constrained case, ψ is equal to 1 for the risky borrowers that borrow fully on the unsecured market (which are the ones with p ∈ [p Z λ , p Y ]). It is equal to 1 − λ for the borrowers that borrow as far as possible on the secured market. We recall that borrowers with p i < p Z λ invest in the safe asset, while the others invest in the risky asset.
Thus, the formula becomes
We note that the borrower's choices, and thus the threshold values p Z λ and p Y λ , depend on the interest rates that will be applied by the lender. Thus, the resulting equations would have to be solved recursively, until an equilibrium is found.
In the collateral-constrained case, we have a pooling equilibrium in one case In the externality case, the borrowers and the lenders do not take the externality into account in the derivation of their decisions. Thus, the analysis is the same as in the basic model.
The lender will set R u ≥ R s θ A , and all borrowers will borrow on the secured market, with borrowers with p i < p T investing in the safe asset and borrowers with p i > p T investing in the risky asset.
Again, we have a pooling equilibrium, with all borrowers borrowing on the secured market.
Normative analysis and comparison with the positive case
We rst consider the social planner's choice, in order to derive a benchmark allocation to which we can compare the market outcome. The social planner would choose the borrowers that should invest in the risky asset to maximise total welfare. We dene total welfare as the sum of lenders' and borrowers' expected payos. The social planner is risk-neutral.
We assume that investments are worth undertaking, i.e. that both θ and A are greater than I. In this case, it is the interest of the social planner to ensure that investments are always undertaken. The only question is whether a borrower should invest in the safe or the risky asset.
From the perspective of the social planner, i.e. from an economy-wide perspective, the distribution of losses if an investment is not successful does not play a role. Moreover, collateral is not lost for the overall economy, and the distribution of collateral between market participants is not relevant for total welfare, so the choice of market (secured or unsecured) does not play a role from a perspective of the social planner in assigning borrowers to the risky or safe asset. Finally, interest payments are not relevant from the perspective of the social planner, as they do not change the aggregate situation.
(This assumption can be relaxed easily -if A is less than 1, then it is not in the interest of the social planner that investments are always undertaken, but only if θp i is greater than 1. Replacing 'safe investment' by 'no investment', the discussion below can easily be generalised to this case.)
Baseline model
In this case, it is the interest of the social planner to ensure that the risky investment is chosen whenever θp i > A and that the safe investment is chosen otherwise. Thus, there is a clear cut-o value p T = A/θ. Borrowers In order for a borrower to invest in the risky asset, the expected return from the risky asset (the return in case of success times the probability of success) must be equal to or greater than the return from the safe asset. If F is the cumulative distribution function associated with f , then F (p T ) borrowers invest in the safe asset and 1 − F (p T ) borrowers invest in the risky asset.
The total welfare, according to the social planner, is then
In the basic case, the market outcome is the same as the one that the social planner would choose, and no friction arises. All borrowers will borrow on the secured market, with borrowers with p i < p T investing in the safe asset and borrowers with p i > p T investing in the risky asset.
Collateral constraints
As argued before, the social planner does not care about the use of collateral or about interest payments, as these are between economic agents only and do not change the aggregate situation. Thus, the benchmark allocation that would be chosen by the social planner is the same as in the non-constrained case (see above).
In the collateral-constrained case, we recall that we have to distinguish two cases:
We also recall that as long as θ > A > R u I(1 − λ) and λ < 1, we have p T λ < p T . In the rst case, the borrower will invest in the safe asset whenever p i ≤ p T λ .
In the second case, the borrower will invest in the safe asset for p i < p Z λ . In both cases, the market solution diers from the socially optimal one that would be chosen by the social planner (where the borrower would invest in the safe asset if and only if p i ≤ p T ). Thus collateral shortage will always lead to a sub-optimal market outcome.
The reason is "moral hazard" behaviour: When borrowing on the unsecured market, the borrower can pass losses on to the lender. Thus, a risky investment can become protable for the borrower even when the expected prot lies below the prot from the safe investment. The lender compensates for his expected losses by charging higher interest rates on the unsecured market on average.
But he cannot distinguish between borrowers that will invest in the safe asset and those that will invest in the risky asset. Thus, borrowers that invest in the safe asset (or which have a very high probability of success) cross-subsidise borrowers which have a medium-high probability of success for the risky asset and invest in this anyway, even though this is not socially optimal. This is a problem for the social planner (as unproductive risky investments are being realised instead of the safe investment that yields a higher expected return). The borrowers with p i ∈ [p T λ , p T ] will invest in the risky asset, while the social planner would like them to invest in the safe asset.
Externality
The externality represented by the factor δ lowers the probability of success if the aggregate risk taken in the economy is too high. We recall that the externality materialises by changing
cut-o value between borrowers choosing the safe and the risky investment.
Based on the same argumentation as for the basic case, one sees that it is the interest of the social planner to ensure that the risky investment is chosen 
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For the positive case, there would again be a deviation of the market solution from the optimal outcome that would be chosen by the social planner. Since borrowers and lenders do not take the externality into account, borrowers with p i < p T invest in the safe asset and borrowers with p i > p T invest in the risky asset.
The externality materialises as multiplication of p i with δ, where δ was dened as F (p E ), with p E the threshold value for choosing between a safe and a risky investment. Note that we have p E = p T .
According to the social planner, borrowers with p i < p T /δ = p T /F (p T ) should invest in the safe asset and borrowers with
should invest in the risky asset.
The borrowers with p i ∈ [p T , p T /F (p T )] will thus invest in the risky asset, while the social planner would like them to invest in the safe asset.
Discussion
In the basic case, despite the existence of asymmetric information, the market outcome is socially optimal.
Collateral shortage always leads to a suboptimal market outcome. However, two cases can be distinguished: The case where all borrowers borrow in the secured market as much as possible (pooling equilibrium), and the case where some borrowers borrow all their funding needs on the unsecured market (partial pooling equilibrium). In both cases, the outcome is suboptimal, because a moral hazard area arises where losses are passed on from the borrower to the lender. This area is larger in the second case than in the rst case.
An externality also leads to a suboptimal market outcome, as there is a range of borrowers which will invest in the risky asset while the social planner would like them to invest in the safe asset.
The suboptimal market outcomes show the need for intervention by a public authority, i.e. a central bank or a regulator.
The model with a central bank
The central bank in our model can act as a mediator on the interbank market via a corridor system. We establish the cases for which such a mediation function is welfare-improving. The central bank provides a deposit facility with an interest rate R df . For the lender, the option to hold deposits with the central bank is an alternative to lending on the secured market, as both actions are risk-free. By setting the interest rate on the deposit facility, the central bank can thus give a lower bound for the interest rate on the secured market. The central bank can also provide a lending facility with an interest rate R CB , where it lends funds against central bank eligible collateral. Obviously, the central bank will set its interest rates such that R df < R CB . The width of the corridor is then
To model the central bank as a lender of last resort for banks, we assume that the collateral range accepted by the central bank is wider than that assumed by markets. We also assume that market participants have enough central bank eligible collateral available, even if they have used up all collateral eligible on the secured market. Thus, even in the collateral-constrained case, market participants can satisfy all their funding needs by borrowing from the central bank.
We assume that a lender always has the option to deposit his funds at the central bank's deposit facility.
Corollary 6 If there is a central bank that oers a deposit facility and if the interest rate at the deposit facility is R df , then R s ≥ R df holds for the equilibrium market interest rate on the secured market.
With a well-functioning capital market, the secured interest rate will therefore be equal to the deposit facility rate, R df , or max(1, R df ) if there is a safe store of assets as an alternative. In principle, R df could also be negative. If there is no safe store of assets, then R s could become negative as well.
Note that we do not assume any further liquidity-providing operations as this does not unduly restrict our model. Some central banks operate with a corridor system only, so that the model would perfectly describe their behaviour. that can be used for both. '
As outlined above, we model the central bank as a secured lender with interest rate R CB and a deposit facility with interest rate R df < R CB . For example, one can consider a situation where there is a marginal lending facility where banks can receive unlimited amounts of liquidity.
We have seen that, with a well-functioning capital market, R df = R S (if R df ≥ 1, which we assume in the following).
We also assume that the central bank collateral framework is wider than the range of collateral accepted by markets, such that collateral constraints would not hold for borrowing at the central bank -even if a borrower is collateral constrained, he could obtain the remaining funding at the central bank via other types of collateral.
[This assumption is motivated by the concrete situation in the case of the ECB, by the fact that the central bank in general plays the role of a lender of last resort, and by the fact that the central bank is not liquidity constrained and can thus take illiquid, but otherwise valuable, collateral.]
Baseline model
As R CB > R df and R df = R s , we have R CB > R s . Thus, no borrower will borrow at the central bank, as borrowing on the secured market is always cheaper.
The central bank cannot exert an inuence on market conditions in this case, which is also not necessary, as they are socially optimal.
Collateral constraints
The existence of the central bank creates an additional funding opportunity for borrowers. Borrowing from the central bank replaces borrowing on the unsecured market when the unsecured market rate rises above the central bank rate. The central bank thus eectively provides a corridor for market interest rates.
Recall that we had two cases in the collateral constrained case: First the pooling equilibrium,
The analysis is similar in the two cases.
If R CB > R u , then the existence of the central bank has no eect. If R CB < R u , then some borrowers will move from the unsecured market to the central bank. In particular, borrowers which are planning to invest safe anyway or borrowers with very high success probabilities will move towards central bank funding. This will induce lenders to increase the unsecured rate (as an increased share of "moral hazard" borrowers would participate in the unsecured market), again pushing more borrowers to borrow at the central bank. An equilibrium ' Note that of course this simplication does not explicitly model the need for adequate risk-control measures for dierent types of collateral. While this is important, not explicitly modelling such risk-control measures does not change the implications of the model. 21 arises when central bank lending has completely crowded out the unsecured market: This can happen with a central bank rate above the secured market rate (as long as the unsecured rate has become so high that even moral hazard borrowers could not make a prot from passing on their losses). In this case, borrowers will invest in the safe asset exactly if p i < p T , and social welfare is optimal.
However, as the central bank may have an intrinsic interest in keeping up market activity, this may not be an overall desirable setup. Rather, the central bank would most likely set the interest rate R CB somewhere above a normal market rate R u , in order to only step in when the deviation of R u from R S is too large.
Thus, the central bank would tolerate a limited amount of suboptimality in the market outcome in order to sustain a functioning unsecured interbank market, but would step in as a lender of last resort in case of disruptions that drive up the unsecured interest rate above the level tolerated by the central bank.
Alternatively, the central bank could consider to restrict the amounts of liquidity that can be borrowed at the central bank, whereby some unsecured market activity would be preserved, but social welfare could still be improved overall. However, it would need to be explicitly modelled how the central bank would allocate its liquidity to borrowers, which in turn would determine the equilibrium outcome. We do not explore this route further here.
Finally, we also see that it is important for the central bank to take a wide range of collateral (as otherwise investment opportunities could not be realised), but that it is likewise important that this collateral is valued appropriately (as otherwise a moral hazard region could arise, similar to the case of the unsecured market that we have analysed above, when the borrower expects that he could pass some share of the costs of a failure to the central bank).
Externality
Consider the inecient pooling equilibrium given in the externality case. As we assume that R CB > R df and R df = R s , we have R CB > R s . Thus, no borrower will borrow at the central bank. The central bank cannot exert an inuence on market conditions in this case, even though they are socially suboptimal.
Discussion
The existence of the central bank can be welfare-improving in certain cases (e.g. collateral constraints), but it cannot improve welfare in other cases (e.g. externality). In this case, other authorities (e.g. regulatory authorities) may be needed.
6 The model with a regulator
We model the case of an externality to establish the need for regulation and compare the eect of central bank intervention with the intervention of a regulator.
If the share of borrowers investing in the risky asset is above the social optimum, there is a case for the regulator to intervene. The regulator can intervene either on prices or on quantities. As regards price action, the regulator can intervene via a tax on θ or a subsidy of A; the regulator could also intervene via a tax on R u or a subsidy of R s . As regards quantity action, the regulator could limit investment in θ or activity on the unsecured market, or set a minimum level for investment in A.
In the literature, the LCR has been interpreted as a quantity restriction rather than a as a tax on certain assets (e.g. Perotti and Suarez 2011). This interpretation results from the fact that the LCR restricts the amount of what would correspond to risky assets in our model. As taxing an activity that creates an externality (Pigou 1920 ) has a dierent eect on welfare than imposing a quantity restriction, we also discuss two possible ways of introducing the LCR into the model.
Taking our model in an abstract setting, a regulator that wants to achieve the optimal outcome from the perspective of the social planner could act via regulating either quantities or prices, i.e. in terms of a quantity restriction or in terms of a Pigovian tax. In Perotti and Suarez (2011), a combination of both measures is most ecient. The eect of the regulation depends on the source of the ineciency. We consider both cases separately. Our framework is designed to model Basel III liquidity regulation as described in further detail in Appendix A.1.
Baseline model
In the baseline model, there is no need for the regulator to intervene, as the market outcome is socially optimal.
Collateral constraints
In the case of collateral constraints, the regulator could use price or quantity constraints. However, as the secured market cannot supply all liquidity needed for an adequate overall level of investment, the regulator must not remove the unsecured market completely.
If the regulator wants to act on the interbank markets, he could either limit the volume on the unsecured market by increasing (taxing) the interest rate on the unsecured market, or lowering (subsidising) the interest rate on the secured market. The regulator could, for example, raise the unsecured interest rate R u . The regulator cannot raise it too high, since investment still has to be protable for safe investors, i.e. R u (1 − λ)I + R s λI ≤ A still has to hold. Thus, R u = A−R s λI (1−λ)I is the upper limit for R u .
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Could the regulator achieve an optimal outcome by raising R u as far as possible, i.e. to R u = A−R s λI (1−λ)I ? The answer of course depends on the values of the parameters, but in most cases the regulator cannot achieve the rstbest outcome by raising R u to R u = A−R s λI (1−λ)I . As seen in Proposition 5, the suboptimal case arises when
(1−λ)I in this formula, we see that this is equivalent to θ(1 − λ) + R s λI − A > 0. Inspection shows that there are plausible numerical values for θ, A, R s and λ that full this equation. Thus, the 'moral hazard area' arises in this case, and the optimal outcome cannot be achieved.
If the regulator prefers a quantity restriction, the regulator could limit the volume on the interbank market to exactly the share that borrowers need to obtain on the unsecured market (due to collateral constraints). However, unless the regulator could perfectly control the allocation on the interbank markets there will always be some borrowers that have the incentive to borrow the full amount on the unsecured market, so some borrowers would not obtain any liquidity on the unsecured market and could not realise their investment opportunities. The result is thus clearly suboptimal.
If the regulator wants to act on investment opportunities, the regulator could act with taxes or subsidies, not on interest rates, but by charging a tax on risky investment or subsidising the safe investment. Subsidising safe investments means raising A and taxing risky investments means lowering θ. As the value of A increases or the value of θ decreases, more borrowers will invest in the safe asset.
With given values for R s , R u , λ and I, it is always possible to change A and θ such that [Details to be added.]
Externality
In the externality case, acting on markets does not make sense for the regulator, as all borrowers borrow on the secured market and there is no activity on the unsecured market. Thus, the regulator could act only via directly inuencing the investment opportunities of borrowers.
With respect to the regulation on quantities, the regulator could limit the volume invested in the risky asset θ, or set a minimum level for the volume invested in the safe asset A. Note that every borrower needs to invest the full amount I in a project, so the regulator cannot impose restrictions at an individual level, otherwise no investment would take place at all. The regulator would thus have to impose this restriction on an aggregate level.
For example, one can choose I = 100, θ = 110, A = 101, R s = 1 and λ = 0.7.
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The eect of this regulatory activity depends on how the remaining investment possibilities would be distributed among borrowers. With a market/pricedriven mechanism, it could be possible that borrowers sort according to their type, whereby the borrowers with the highest success probabilities invest in the risky asset and the borrowers with lower success probabilities invest in the safe asset. In this case, if the regulator sets the quantity thresholds at the socially optimal amounts corresponding to a share of F (p T ) (to be set as a minimum share) for the safe asset or a share of 1 − F (p T ) (to be set as a maximum share)
for the risky asset, a socially optimal outcome can be achieved.
With a mechanism whereby the restriction is allocated to individual borrowers without taking their type into account, i.e. by chance or via a process driven by another characteristic of the borrower, independent of their success probability, the outcome will be suboptimal.
With respect to regulating prices, the regulator could act with taxes or subsidies, i.e. by charging a tax on risky investment or subsidising the safe investment. For the borrower, this would correspond to changing the values of A and θ. Subsidising safe investments means raising A and taxing risky investments means lowering θ. As the value of A increases or the value of θ decreases, more borrowers will invest in the safe asset. The threshold value between borrowers that invest safe and those that invest risky will increase. In the externality case, this can be used to shift this threshold value to the desired, socially optimal level.
The regulator could set this tax/subsidy such that the risky investment is protable for a borrower if and only if p i > p T /δ, by either multiplying A with 1/δ or multiplying θ with δ. The new threshold value would then be A θδ = p T /δ. (A combination of subsidising A and taxing θ is of course also possible. There is always a combination of subsidy and tax that renders the outcome cost-neutral for the regulator: Multiply A with c = A+θ a+θδ as subsidy and θ with δc as tax.)
The interest rate on the secured market does not change, as it is driven by the central bank (deposit) rate (or zero, in the absence of a central bank but in the presence of a store of value). The unsecured market will disappear completely, so no statement about unsecured interest rates can be made.
If the value of A is raised above θ, the market equilibrium diers, because no borrower would want to invest in the risky asset. As raising the value of A above what is necessary to compensate the externality is inecient, this would not constitute an ecient equilibrium. Thus, regulation can achieve a socially optimal outcome in case of an externality of the type considered in the model, either by price or quantity restrictions. Proposition 7 Liquidity regulation can lead to a socially optimal outcome in certain cases of ineciencies (e.g. externalities of the type considered in our model).
This can be achieved via a quantity restriction (limiting the volume of risky investments or setting a minimum volume for safe investments), a price restriction (taxing risky investments and/or subsidising safe investments), or both. The quantity restriction would lead to a socially optimal outcome if adequate 25 market mechanisms for the allocation of the restriction can be assumed. The price restriction, if calibrated correctly, will always lead to a socially optimal outcome. 7 The model with a central bank and a regulator As seen in previous sections, the central bank intervenes by setting an interest rate R CB . The regulator can intervene either by inuencing the interbank markets or investment opportunities, via prices or quantities.
Intervening on the interbank markets can create a conict with the central bank:
• Intervention on R s is a direct conict with the central bank deposit facility and leaves room for innite arbitrage.
• Intervention on R u can lead to a conict with central bank, as in eect the corridor will not function in the way designed by the central bankbanks could be pushed into central bank operations because R u (plus the tax) rises above R CB in a situation where the central bank did not want to replace the unsecured market yet. So the regulator could achieve an ecient outcome, but at the expense of the central bank.
• Quantity restriction on the unsecured market may work in the same way, as it could drive up the price to a level R u > R CB where the central bank intermediation takes over.
Intervening on A or θ does not have the same potential for direct conicts with the central bank. However, in case an unsecured market exists, these interventions would always be designed with the ultimate aim of pushing borrowers onto the secured market, as any activity on the unsecured market creates ineciencies from the viewpoint of the social planner. Thus, such regulatory intervention would ultimately also lead to a situation where the activity on the unsecured market is reduced, which may not be the aim of the central bank.
This leads to a conict of interest between the central bank and the regulator:
The central bank has two aims: (1) to steer funding conditions for the economy by setting the lower bound for the corridor, R df , which becomes the anchor for the secured rate R s ; and (2) allowing for activity on the unsecured market while addressing tails risks, i.e. a situation where the unsecured rate would rise too much above the secured rate, by setting an upper bound of the corridor R CB .
When the upper bound is set such that safe investments are always protable, this allows the central bank to pursue the aim of getting investment to take place (i.e. pursuing the secondary aim of supporting growth, as long it is in line with the primary aim of ensuring price stability). Thus, the central bank addresses ineciencies that would come from collateral constraints to some extent, but not fully, while not touching ineciencies coming from negative externalities.
The regulator has the aim of reducing ineciencies in the market, arising from the negative externalities as well as from collateral constraints. Given that ineciencies exist as soon as there is an unsecured market, the regulator would in principle design regulation such that (almost) all activity is pushed onto the secured market -just leaving enough activity on the unsecured market so that the collateral constraints do not keep investors from investing at all.
Furthermore, the regulator would steer A and θ to inuence investment decisions directly.
[Details to be added.]
Conclusion
The Second, the existence of a central bank may be welfare-improving if the initial market outcome is not ecient due to asymmetric information and collateral constraints. Then central bank lending under certain conditions can supplement the market by oering contracts that the market will not provide. However, it is advisable that the central bank lending rate and collateral requirements are not chosen such that they partially or completely crowd out the secured market.
Moreover, the central bank cannot achieve the rst-best outcome in the presence of an externality.
Third, the regulator can achieve an ecient outcome in the presence of the externality. When there are collateral constraints and asymmetric information in the market, the regulator may improve upon the market outcome, but can never achieve the rst-best outcome.
Fourth, depending on the initial market outcome and the regulator's reaction to ineciencies, the regulator may interfere with the central bank policy in a way that makes the nal outcome clearly inferior to either central bank intervention 27 or regulatory intervention. If the regulator intervenes on the unsecured market, the outcome may be inferior as the intermediation function is then completely shifted to the central bank, depending on how the regulator intervenes in the market.
Our results suggest that it is of utmost importance to acknowledge that central bank lending can improve on the market outcome in a crisis situation and that an additional regulatory response would not necessarily increase eciency. It depends on the design of the regulatory response. This has direct implications for the implementation of global liquidity regulation. An analysis and identication of the market equilibrium, in which the regulator intervenes, is crucial for the regulatory intervention to be actually welfare-improving.
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Appendix A A.1 Basel III liquidity regulation and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
In this section, we discuss the eect of Basel III liquidity regulation and the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) in the context of our model.
Regulation prescribes that the LCR has to be above 100% at all times, where
LCR =
High-quality liquid assets net outows over 30-day horizon .
In our model, regulation can be used to address negative externalities and ineciencies stemming from collateral constraints, as outlined above. The LCR can be seen as a form of regulation in the model, via a price eect (indirectly, by making certain investments more attractive than others, as they will improve the LCR) and a quantity eect (by limiting the activity of certain economic agents on certain markets, given the restriction that they have to comply with the LCR requirements). How exactly these eects play out depends on the original situation of the market player, but we take a stylized approach in the model.
We model short-term interbank markets (maturity below 30 days), so that the borrowing/lending on the interbank market aects the net outows over a 30-day horizon (NetOut). Furthermore, we assume that collateral consists of High-quality liquid assets (HQLA).
Thus, borrowing/lending on the secured market has no eect on the LCR (as the outow of funds is matched with an inow of collateral of the same magnitude). By contrast, borrowing/lending on the unsecured market will have an eect. Namely, if an amount I is borrowed on the unsecured market, then a bank which had LCR = HQLA/N etOut before will have LCR ′ with LCR ′ = HQLA + I N etOut + I .
This will move the LCR closer to 1. Thus, if a bank was LCR-constrained (i.e. had an LCR < 1), then it has an incentive to borrow unsecured instead of secured.
Furthermore, the regulatory treatment favours borrowing from the central bank (by applying lower outow rates). Thus, LCR-constrained banks have a strong incentive to borrow at the central bank. The above discussion only touches on the interbank market, without considering the investment opportunities discussed in our model.
Taking the investment into account, we can make the following distinction:
We assume that the safe asset can be easily liquidated and is included in highquality liquid assets, while the risky asset is not included therein. Thus, LCRconstrained banks will have an incentive to invest in the safe asset.
To summarise, we can identify three eects of the LCR in our model:
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• LCR-constrained banks have an incentive to borrow unsecured instead of secured.
• LCR-constrained banks have a strong incentive to borrow from the central bank.
• LCR-constrained banks have an incentive to invest in the safe asset.
The impact of the LCR depends on the number of banks that are LCRconstrained. In case this number of LCR-constrained banks is not too high and the LCR can be satised by the banking system as a whole, the unsecured market can be used to shift LCR-leeway from one bank to the other. This shift can be seen as an additional reason for the existence of an unsecured market.
The shift to the unsecured market may blur the price signal on the unsecured market. It may also lead to higher risk-taking behaviour that could be suboptimal. To the extent that this path cannot be pursued to satisfy the LCR-requirements of all banks, or banks choose not to fully exploit this "socially neutral" way of fullling the LCR, LCR-constrained banks remain.
In this case, the LCR requirements may lead to further reasons for a suboptimal outcome in our model. First, the fact that LCR-constrained banks have a strong incentive to borrow from the central bank will lead to the use of central bank funding instead of market funding. This has a negative impact on market functioning. (However, there is no eect on the allocation of investment, as seen by the social planner. -Only to the extent that lenders do not have a safe store of value, while the central bank does, or that moral hazard is attached to central bank borrowing; one could explore that avenue further.)
Second, depending on the relationship between p i and LCR i at the individual bank level, the fact that LCR-constrained banks have an incentive to invest in the safe asset may lead banks with good risky investment opportunities (i.e.
where θp i > A) to nevertheless invest in the safe asset. This would happen if costs of not fullling the LCR, e.g. nes charged by the regulator or the nancial eect of credibility losses (that could for example lead to higher bank funding costs in general), would be greater than the additional expected gain from investing in the risky opportunity.
In crisis times, interbank markets do not work properly, and the central bank has assumed an intermediation role. LCR-constraints cannot be shifted around any more via the unsecured market, so this exacerbates the central bank role and leads to more central bank funding for LCR-constrained banks.
Furthermore, there is a higher incentive to invest in safe, liquid assets if banks are LCR-constrained (independent of the value of p i ), which means that less risky projects are realised even if they would be protable. This in turn leads to a less optimal social outcome. (For example, this could be seen as exacerbating a credit crunch that may be one of the big risk factors in crisis times anyway.) The interplay between the central bank and liquidity regulation could be benecial if the incentive to invest in risky assets would be countered by the need to invest in safe assets because of the HQLA.
